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Abstract
The increasing number of satellites and orbital debris in low Earth orbit is considered as a form of a
‘tragedy of the commons’, the overexploitation of a communal resource. This is assessed and analysed
using game theory. Some solutions to the problem are suggested.
Introduction
Low Earth orbit (LEO) is becoming increasingly
utilised by satellites from all nations for scientific, mil-
itary and commercial applications. Due to this, there
is an ever increasing amount of orbital debris and a
rising lack of available space in LEO [1]. Both of these
problems can compromise vehicle safety, operation and
perhaps endanger astronaut lives. While a number of
solutions to this problem have been proposed, at this
time none of these solutions are generally available.
According to the United Nation’s Outer Space Treaty
Article II, ‘Outer space, including the Moon and other
celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropria-
tion by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupa-
tion, or by any other means’ [2]. This essentially means
that low Earth orbit can be described as a commons
in the sense that it is open access for all and cannot be
owned by any entity.
A commons refers to any resource that is freely con-
sumable by any person or entity. It originally referred
to medieval common pasture land, whereby a villager
may graze his or her cattle upon the common land. G.
Hardin proposed a scenario now known as ’the tragedy
of the commons’ [3] where it was recognised that it is in
each villager’s best interest to continue adding cattle to
graze, while at the same time if this trend is applied by
all the villagers, eventually the common grazing land
itself will become overgrazed and unable to be used by
any villager. The idea of a ‘tragedy of the commons’
can be applied to any situation whereby there is a re-
source to be freely consumed, one such example is the
overfishing of cod fish off the coast of Newfoundland
[4].
It can be seen that the ever increasing usage of the
commons of low Earth orbit, could be seen as an ap-
proaching tragedy of the commons whereby sending
one satellite is advantageous to all, however a critical
point may be reached when there are too many satel-
lites in low Earth orbit for the system to be advanta-
geous to any of them.
Low Earth Orbit
Low Earth orbit is defined as any orbit between 160km
and 2000km [5]. The number of satellites in low Earth
orbit is currently approximately 3000 [6] and this num-
ber has been consistently increasing over time. While
it is difficult to know precisely how many satellites
could feasibly be placed in LEO without compromis-
ing the system, it is foreseeable that this number could
be reached soon. Another problem is the widely doc-
umented problem of space debris as a result of satel-
lite and spacecraft activity. Due to the high energies
involved in these vehicles, the fragments can collide
with functioning satellites and cause these satellites to
break up themselves. It can therefore be seen that
this process is one of positive feedback. One piece
of debris can potentially cause many more, which of
course themselves can collide with orbiting satellites
or other debris further exacerbating the problem. This
is known as the ‘Kessler syndrome’ after D. J. Kessler
[1] and the nature of the feedback process could leave
space inaccessible due to the ubiquity of space debris
and mission-ending collisions. Due to these problems,
it seems best to understand how best to avoid such
a Kessler syndrome and indeed to prevent the over-
utilisation of low Earth orbit.
Game Theory
A tragedy of the commons such as the over-exploitation
of low Earth orbit can be described by game theory as
a form of the prisoner’s dilemma [7]. In the tragedy of
the commons rather than having two prisoners with
the choice of cooperating or defecting, it is a group of
people that are given this choice. In terms of the low
Earth orbit problem, these groups of people would
be satellite launchers such as governmental agencies,
research institutes and commercial operators. This is
an interesting extension to the original tragedy of the
commons formulation, for it is a collective entity that
cooperates or defects rather than an individual. How-
ever, this can be modeled in the same sense given that
these entities are capable of cooperating and defecting.
The many player prisoner’s dilemma exists such that
in the idealised game there is a social benefit B that
each player can achieve if a cost of C is paid [7]. In such
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a scheme, launching a satellite (or defecting) would re-
sult in a benefit without cost, assuming that n or more
choose to cooperate. However, if more than n choose
to defect then a tragedy of the commons occurs and
no benefit is found. Alternatively, if an entity cooper-
ated by not launching while others launched, the cost
would be C with no benefit. If more than n choose to
cooperate then a benefit is realised along with a cost.
This is shown in the payoff matrix below.
Table 1: Payout matrix depicting the costs and benefits of
cooperating and defecting in a ’tragedy of the commons’-
type game [7].
Decision More than n
choose to co-
operate
n or fewer
choose to
cooperate
Cooperate C + B C
Defect B 0
As can be seen, if fewer than n entities choose to
cooperate then the payout is 0 for defectors. The only
worse scenario than this is a cooperator in a situation
where there exists n or fewer cooperators who is sub-
jected to the cost without any benefit. Thus the payoffs
are order B > (B + C) > 0 > C. There are two sta-
ble equilibrium points to this payout matrix. The first
where everyone is a defector and receives 0. Any co-
operator in this scenario would simply see the cost of
cooperating with no benefit. This could be seen as the
situation now, where all entities choose to continue to
place satellites in to orbit and space debris continues
to grow. The second stable point is where just more
than n choose to cooperate. In this scenario, the de-
fectors will gain the benefit, B, and the cooperators
will receive (B + C). However, if a defector becomes
a cooperator, they move from B to B + C and a co-
operator becoming a defector will force the system to
fewer than n cooperators and result in a payout of 0.
Potential Solutions
When expressed in a payout matrix this conclusion
seems obvious, however it is unlikely in a real situation
that full knowledge of the problem is available and it is
impossible to know when the stable n point has been
reached. To address this problem, entities launching
satellites and those responsible for space debris need
to be in open dialogue so that a better understand-
ing of the stable n point can be reached and a poten-
tial tragedy of the commons averted. This would be
the equivalent of a government legislating to protect
a commons, however even in this system there may
be law breakers. Other less mathematical solutions to
the tragedy of the commons problem in general have
been determined. One in particular is the privatisation
of the commons in question. This would undoubtedly
resolve the problem due to reducing access to the com-
mons (it would cease to be a commons at all), but there
are negative side effects, both of a practical nature and
an ethical nature. Essentially the problem can be re-
solved by mutual understanding between all entities as
to the effect of their actions. In the space industry, the
relatively low number of parties involved could make
this process easier, however military space technology
satellite launches and locations are often classified and
any such definitive discussion could prove difficult.
Conclusion
The proliferation of satellites in low Earth orbit along
with an associated increase in space debris can be as-
sessed in the form of a ‘tragedy of the commons’-type
problem. The problem was assessed with the use of
game theory. While not easily resolvable, these type of
problems appear frequently in resource allocation and
solutions can be employed. It is in no-one’s interest
to cause a ’Kessler syndrome’ event or to overpopulate
low Earth orbit, thus these issues must be addressed.
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